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Recent research has emphasized the influence of colonization on the institutional 
development and economic performance in former European colonies. Where European 
colonizers settled, they replicated the investment-conducive institutions found at home. 
It has been argued that a harsh disease environment and a highly urbanized native 
population worked against colonization. We show evidence for another significant 
element explaining the endogenous character of colonization strategies and the 
formation of institutions. We find the presence of precious metals, gold and silver, to 
imply an increase in settlements, and an improvement in institutional quality, even when 
correcting for settlements. Highly valued gold and silver reserves attracted Europeans in 
large numbers and resulted in an institutional upgrade of mineral-rich areas. 
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
 A  number  of  recent  studies  has  placed  a  particular  emphasis  on  the  role  of  institutions  in 
explaining  the  large  differences  in  income  per  capita  observed  across  the  world  (see  e.g. 
Acemoglu et. al 2001, 2002, Knack and Keefer 1995, Mauro 1995, 1998). An average citizen in 
the U.S. receives an annual income more than 20 times larger the one of an average civilian in 
Ethiopia or in Sri Lanka. “Good” institutions create an environment conducive to investment in 
physical and human capital, and contribute therefore to substantial welfare achievement. On the 
other hand, “bad” institutions discourage individuals from undertaking investments by creating 
uncertainty and low expected returns. 
  The  distinction  between  “good”  and  “bad”  institutions  for  long-term  development  is, 
however, not obvious. To some extent, ‘institutions’ is so vague as a notion that it can include 
almost  everything  that  affects  long-term  income.  It  can  comprise  the  extent  of  democratic 
liberties,  the  degree  of  corruption,  the  level  of  political  stability,  as  well  as  all  kinds  of 
regulations that encourage (or discourage) investment, schooling or trade. A major institutional 
feature is the system that governs how prices are determined or how the market for production 
and inputs is regulated. 
  In  this  paper,  we  capture  institutional  differences  among  countries  by  focusing  on  the 
variation  in  the  extent of  property  rights.  The  importance  of  property  rights  in  encouraging 
investment,  entrepreneurship  and  income  growth  has  long  been  established  in  the  literature 
(Hayeck 1960, North 1991). In this context, good institutions relate to secure and effective rights 
of  private  property,  that  ensure  secure  investing  opportunities  (and  thus  returns)  to  a  broad 
section of the society. On the other side, bad institutions imply a large risk of expropriation for 
investors, a limited allocation of property rights within the local population, as well as severe 
difficulties in enforcing them. In that respect, we largely follow Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002)  
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that also emphasize the importance of property rights for investments, industrialization and long-
term development. 
  Acemoglu  et  al.  (2001,  2002)  argue  that  institutional  development  outside  Europe  was 
influenced to a large extent by the colonization policies of the European powers. The colonizing 
powers developed two different strategies that created an institutional divergence in the colonies. 
In some colonies, Europeans settled in large numbers, importing the institutions prevailing at 
their countries of origin. They tried to replicate the institutional framework of their metropolises, 
largely based on the protection of private property rights. In the other colonies, Europeans settled 
in small numbers, and mainly limited the institutional set up to an efficient administration for 
extracting resources from the local colony economies. Acemoglu et al. find two explanations for 
the  two  different  settlement  strategies  of  the  colonizers.  First,  they  claim  that  the  disease 
environment played an important role (see Acemoglu et al. 2001). Secondly, they argue that 
sparsely  populated  (and  urbanized)  regions  enabled  Europeans  to  settle  in  larger  numbers 
compared to densely-populated areas (Acemoglu et al. 2002). 
  We build on the same framework and extend it, analyzing another determinant of European 
settlements. The resource affluence of the colonizing area also determined the settlement strategy 
of colonizers. We argue that the variability of endowments in the precious metals of gold and 
silver  across  colonized  areas  is  likely  to  have  affected  the  settling  planning  of  Europeans. 
Precious metals were to a large extent the main minerals reaching Europe from the New World 
countries. Gold and silver were both exported to meet demand by the elites of the European 
societies. The prestigious character of these precious metals of relative high value and low labor-
intensive  production  established  their  producing  regions  as  prominent  settling  destinations 
among colonizers. In the eyes of potential settlers, the sparkle of gold and silver made their 
originating  countries  gleam  as  well.  Figure 1  illustrates  the  variability  in  the  production  of 
precious metals outside Europe in 1900  
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  Our analysis is of particular interest in relation to the recently invigorated interest on the 
impact of resource abundance on welfare (see Atkinson and Hamilton 2003, Bulte et al. 2005, 
Neumayer 2004, Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2004). A large body of empirical and theoretical work 
(e.g. Auty 1994, Gylfason 2001, Leite and Weidmann 1999, Sachs sand Warner 1995, 2001, 
Torvik  2001,  2002)  establishes  a  negative  link  between  resource  affluence  and  economic 
performance; a phenomenon often referred to as the resource curse hypothesis. Other studies 
either  cast  doubt  on  these  findings  criticizing  the  assumptions  adopted,  or  the  statistical 
estimations, or they accentuate the beneficial role of natural resources on development in the past 
(see Davis 1995, Manzano and Rigobon 2003, Stijns 2005). We argue that in colonial history, 
mineral  endowments  supported  welfare  improvements  through  attracting  colonizers  and 
stimulating  the  set  up  of  good  market  institutions.  The  impact  of  resources  on  colonization 
strategies is still reflected in the income distribution observed nowadays across the world  
  Section 2 summarizes the various hypotheses on the causes of colonization strategies and it 
tests  these  empirically.  Specifically  it  analyzes  the  significance  of  precious  metals  as  an 
additional  explanatory  variable  for  both  settlement  behavior  and  institutional  development. 





FIGURE 1. Precious Metals in Colonized Countries 
 
2. PATTERNS OF COLONIZATION 
2.1. The Mortality Hypothesis 
The Mortality Hypothesis presupposes a negative relationship between European mortality rates 
in  colonized  areas  and  European  settlements,  and  a  positive  relation  of  the  latter  with  the 
establishment of a pro-growth institutional framework. According to this hypothesis, Europeans 
settled in small numbers in regions of higher mortality rates, mainly caused by malaria and 
yellow fever (see Curtin 1964, 1998). On the other side, Europeans settled in larger numbers in 
areas where they faced a less harsh disease environment, outnumbering in some occasions the 
indigenous population. In turn, the magnitude of the settlers’ influx to the New World countries 
was  a  major  determinant  of  the  institutional  policies  established  across  regions.  Europeans 
attempted to reproduce a European structural organization in the newly-colonized areas, and 
succeeded to replicate the home institutions when settling in large numbers (Denoon 1983). In  
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that respect, institutions of extensive and well-guarded property rights were broadly established 
to accommodate the demands of colonizers to imitate the capitalist structure of their societies 
(e.g. La Porta et al. 1998, 1999). 
  Acemoglu et al. (2001) establish the link between the disease environment of the colonized 
world and the following institutional development, using data on the mortality rates of soldiers, 
bishops and sailors between the 17
th and 19
th centuries. They argue that local diseases were often 
fatal  to  many  European  settlers,  while  the  indigenous  populations  had  developed  immunity 
towards them. Awareness, back in Europe, of this disease environment influenced to a large 
extent  the  settlement  decisions  of  the  colonizing  powers.  In  that  respect,  mortality  rates 
determined consecutively settlement policies, institutional development and economic affluence. 
2.2. The Urbanization Hypothesis 
The Urbanization Hypothesis stresses the importance of urbanization patterns across different 
parts of the colonized world in shaping the immigration patterns of European settlers (for a 
discussion on the issue see Sokoloff and Engerman 2000 and Acemoglu et al. 2002). Europeans 
had a preference for sparsely populated areas, where they could settle in large numbers without 
engaging into frequent conflicts  with the native populations. To the extent that urbanization 
reflects the level of development, highly urbanized local societies corresponded to affluent and 
well-structured  social  structures,  which  were  more  likely  to  rebel  against  the  imposition  of 
European  law  and  order  rather  than  the  less  organized  sparsely  populated  areas.  Densely 
populated areas were thus less desired for Europeans emigration, and when Europeans moved to 
these areas, they preferred to settle in small numbers and to set up institutions for resource 
wealth extraction, rather than to imitate the pro-growth institutional framework of their home 
countries.  The  extractive  institutions  were  framed  to  force  the  local  labor  force  to  work  in 
plantations, and to reap a share of local income through taxation. In the densely and highly-
urbanized areas, the Europeans pursued to establish an administration based on the concentration  
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of power in the hands of a few settlers, which could create income through oppression (see Dunn 
1972). 
  Acemoglu et al. (2002) provide econometric evidence on the linkage between urbanization 
patterns  and  the  development  of  subsequent  institutions  across  the  colonized  world  using 
population density data and numbers of population centers consisting of more than 5000 people. 
They claim that countries more prosperous and densely populated in 1500 became disadvantaged 
in terms of their institutional inheritance by European colonizers. Affluent densely-populated 
regions attracted few European settlers who established extractive institutions. Ultimately, this 
colonization pattern resulted in a reversal of fortune. 
2.3. The Precious Metals Hypothesis 
According to the Precious-Metals Hypothesis, the mineral endowment of colonies influenced to 
a large extent the colonizing policies of Europeans. We focus on gold and silver because of their 
relative  high  value  per  weight,  but  also  due  to  the  fact  that  these  minerals  were  the  main 
exporting  minerals  to  the  colonizing  powers.  Furthermore,  most  of  non-ferrous  mineral 
production (copper, zinc, aluminium, chromium, lead etc) was either of negligible amount or 
non-existent during the colonization process of most countries. Our analysis bears resemblance 
to  the  approach  by  Easterly  and  Levine  (2003)  that  also  focus  on  the  impact  of  primary 
commodities  on  institutions,  although  they  use  recent  dummy  variables  rather  than  detailed 
historical data and they do not relate their findings to the colonization strategies of Europeans. 
Furthermore,  they  do  not  discern  between  agricultural  commodities  and  minerals  and 
furthermore they exclude gold production from their dummy index, while we specifically focus 
on gold as probably the most valuable mineral at the time of colonization. 
  The  precious-metals  hypothesis  rests  on  the  following  premises.  First,  the  New  World 
countries discovered outside Europe provided the old continent with substantial amounts of gold 
and silver. Those newly-discovered countries were not homogeneous in terms of their resource  
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endowment. Some countries had a larger potential as producers of precious metals, a distinction 
the importing European countries were aware of. Second, the extent of resource endowment 
influenced  the  settlement  decision  of  Europeans.  Gold  and  silver  –high-valued  commodities 
exported  to the elites of the European  societies,  that were  capable  to afford them– added a 
prestigious reputation to their producing areas. The lucrative nature of those metals was reflected 
enticingly to the settlement decisions of Europeans. Third, the settlement decision in a specific 
area substantially influenced the institutional framework established. When European settled in 
large numbers, they replicated the institutions found in their originating countries that protected 
to a large extent property rights for a broad section of the society. If Europeans settled in smaller 
numbers, extractive institutions were set up, that granted safe property rights to the ruling elite 
rather  then  to  the  people.  This  third  premise  is  shared  with  the  Mortality  and  Urbanization 
hypothesis.  Fourth,  in  addition  to  the  settlement  decision,  precious  metals  also  affected  the 
institutional  set  up  more  directly.  Settlers  in  a  resource-rich  environment  demanded  better 
institutions than settlers in a resource-poor environment. Fifth, institutions of safe and extensive 
property rights support the process of economic development and, thus, facilitate the attainment 
of  a  higher  level  of  income  per  capita.  This  fifth  premise  is  also  shared  with  the  other 
hypotheses. 
  Table  1  presents  two-stage  least-squares  (2SLS)  estimates  of causes  of  recent economic 
prosperity in the colonized countries, as captured by the log of GDP in 1995 (data provided by 
the World Bank 1999). Panel A shows that institutions have a large and very significant effect on 
the level of economic affluence across the colonized world. Following Acemoglu et al. (2001) 
we use an index of protection against expropriation risk averaged over 1985-1995 (Institutions  
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85-95) varying in the 0 to 10 range, where higher values correspond to better enforcement of 
property rights.
1 
  Panel B of Table 1 exposes the endogenous character of institutions as dependent on factors 
related to European colonialism. To test the Mortality Hypothesis, we use the death rate among 
1000 soldiers for the first year in the 19
th century for which data are available (Log Settler 
Mortality),  as  in  Acemoglu  et  al.  (2001).  To  test  the  Urbanization  Hypothesis,  we  use  the 
percentage of indigenous population living in urban centers of at least 5000 inhabitants in 1500 
(Urbanization 1500), as in Acemoglu et al. (2002). For the Precious-Metals Hypothesis, new in 
this paper, we use the value of gold and silver per square kilometer in 1900 (Gold and Silver 
1900) as a measure of resource affluence (data on prices and quantities are provided by Schmitz 
1979). For all three independent variables, we also tested the impact on income through other 
channels than through institutions, by running a regression with income dependent on institutions 
and settlements, and Log Settler Mortality, Urbanization 1500, and Gold and Silver 1900. None 
of these variables has explanatory power, so that their only impact on income goes indirectly 
through their effect on settlements and institutions. This justifies the use of these variables as 
valid instruments. 
  As depicted in Panel A of Table 1, there is a strong positive correlation between institutions 
and income per capita. This finding has been largely exposed also in Acemoglu et al. (2001, 
2002).  What  is  more  of  interest,  though,  is  the  endogenous  character  of  the  institutional 
development outside Europe. Acemoglu et al. (2001) accentuate the importance of the disease 
environment  in  attracting  settlers  and  institutions  across  the  globe  (i.e.  the  Mortality  Rate 
Hypothesis). Similarly, Acemoglu et al. (2002)  emphasize the influence of  urbanization and 
population  density  on  shaping  colonization  strategies  and  intuitional  development  (i.e.  the 
                                                   
1   Acemoglu et al. (2001) comment on how institutions persist over time.  Their institutional measure at the end 
of the 20
th century is strongly correlated with its values at the beginning of the century.   
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Urbanization  Hypothesis).  The  focal  point  of  our  analysis  lies  in  a  third  factor,  the  role  of 
precious  metals  on  the  flow  of  settlers  and  the  corresponding  import  of  their  institutional 
background. In Panel B, columns (1)-(3), we confirm the negative role urbanization patterns and 
the disease environment played in the institutional development of the colonized world. Column 
(3), however, casts some doubt on the role of early urbanization in shaping institutions when 
controlling for the disease environment. Subsequently, columns (4)-(6) add precious metals to 
the  list  of  explanatory  variables  and  find  a  strongly  significant  contribution  thereof  to  the 
establishment of income-supporting institutions. The precious metals hypothesis is robust when 
tested jointly with the urbanization and settler mortality hypotheses. When testing all hypotheses 
simultaneously (column (6)), we find the precious metals and settler mortality hypotheses to 
complement  each  other  in  explaining  institutional  divergence  across  the  world,  while 
urbanization seems to bear a lower explanatory power. 
  In column (7) we further analyze the role of precious metals and settler mortality in shaping 
institutions, when we control for the fraction of the population of European descent in 1900 
(Settlements 1900, as in Acemoglu et al. 2001). Urbanization 1500 turns out to be insignificant 
and we drop it from the regression. An additional benefit is that we can use a much larger 
sample.  Both  coefficients  for  Precious  Metals  and  Log  Settler  Mortality  fall,  compared  to 
column  (5),  but  remain  highly  significant.  This  suggests  that  a  large  part  of  the  impact  of 
precious  metals  and  the  disease  environment  on  institutions  went  through  influencing 
colonization strategies, but that both variables also had a more direct impact on institutional 
shaping.
  
  Whereas the first table analyzed the effect of precious metals and a less urbanized and milder 
disease environment on institutions, in Table 2, we go back one step, to the settlement decisions, 
and  examine the variables effects on colonization strategies, and subsequently on present-day 
income. Table 2 presents two-stage least-squares (2SLS) estimates of recent welfare levels in  
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former colonies, using the settlements variable as an intermediate channel. The settlement proxy 
is positively correlated with the institutional measure at the 1% level of significance. Panel A of 
Table 2 reveals that, indeed, areas where Europeans settled in large numbers managed to achieve 
higher  levels  of  economic  prosperity  through  the  course  of  time.  Panel  B  examines  the 
endogenous character of settlement decisions. Columns (8)-(10) reveal that a high urbanization 
level and a harsh disease environment discouraged European migration. Both variables are also 
significant when tested jointly (column (10)). In columns (11)-(13), we add precious metals to 
the list of independent variables and we find strong evidence for a tendency of European settlers 
to migrate to regions affluent in precious metals. The last column (13) reveals that, when testing 
jointly for all three hypotheses, precious metals were a more significant cause of settlements than 
the disease environment. 
  To sum up, our findings extend the analysis by Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) on the link 
between  settlements,  institutions  and  welfare  in  the  following  manner.  When  examining  all 
hypotheses jointly (column entries (6) and (13)), we find indigenous urbanization patterns to 
negatively and significantly affect the establishment of European settlements, but to impose a 
rather limited effect on institutional development. Inversely, we find settler mortality to be of 
limited  power  in  explaining  settlements  policies,  while  being  negatively  and  significantly 
correlated with institutional quality. Precious metals, at the same time, had a long-lasting effect 
on  welfare  both  through  increasing  the  number  of  European  settlements  and  by  leading  to 
improved institutions, consecutively. 
  To study whether, indeed, precious metals have a particular and positive effect on present-
day income, we analyze the statistical association between current production levels of various 
minerals and present-day income levels when examined jointly with gold production  (Gold 
1995).  We obtain data on the value of several minerals per square kilometer in 1995 by the 1995 
Commodity Yearbook of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (United  
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Nations 1995). In Table 3 we present some tentative results using disaggregated data for mineral 
production. Our results must be treated, tough, with caution, since disaggregated mineral data do 
not exist for a large sample of countries. Our results confirm that countries rich in gold tend to be 
relatively more prosperous nowadays, perhaps reflecting the long-term effect implied by the 
precious metals hypothesis. This tendency holds when controlling for the production levels of 
other minerals. On the other hand, all other minerals have an insignificant effect on income 
levels,  and  some  minerals  (zinc,  bauxite,  copper,  lead  and  nickel)  even  seem  to  impose  a 
contracting impact on income. The special character of gold is reflected on its strong association 
with institutional quality, as depicted in Table 4, column (25). For a large part, the correlation 
between gold and income goes through the early development of institutions, indeed, as column 
(26) shows. When controlling for Gold and Silver 1900, the coefficient level of current gold 
production and its significance drop substantially. Also, when including the institutional proxy in 
the regressions of Table 3, the coefficient of gold production typically halves. For as much as 
gold is concerned, there is no evidence of a reversal of the resource fortune.  
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TABLE 1.  GDP per capita and Institutions. 
Panel A: Dependent variable:  
log GDP per capita in 1995  
(Two-Stage Least Squares) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Constant   3.37  2.04  4.49  4.35  2.73  4.53  2.59 
Institutions 85-95 
(1.47, 1.45, 1.47) 
     0.74*** 
(0.16) 
     0.92*** 
(0.17) 
     0.58*** 
(0.07) 
     0.60*** 
(0.08) 
     0.82*** 
(0.13) 
     0.57*** 
(0.07) 
     0.84*** 
(0.12) 
R
2 adjusted  0.24  0.36  0.52  0.43  0.41  0.53  0.45 
N  38  38  38  38  64  38  63 
               
Panel B: Dependent variable: 
Institutions 85-95 















Constant  6.30  9.37  12.11  7.28  8.64  11.21  7.76 
Gold and Silver 1900  
(0.98, 1.23, 0.99)                      
     0.55*** 
(0.10) 
     0.43*** 
(0.12) 
  0.25* 
(0.15) 




     –0.11** 
 (0.04)   
     –0.04 
 (0.03) 
     –0.10*** 
 (0.04)   
     –0.05 
 (0.03)   
Log Settler Mortality  
(1.25, 1.25, 1.24)   
    –0.61*** 
 (0.15) 
    –1.21*** 
 (0.21)   
     –0.49*** 
 (0.15) 
    –1.01*** 
 (0.25) 
  –0.35** 
 (0.18) 
Settlements 1900 
(0.26)             
      1.79*** 
(0.65) 
R
2 adjusted   0.25   0.26   0.50   0.32   0.32   0.53   0.36 
N  38  64  38  38  64  38  63 
Note: Standard deviations for independent variables in parentheses, based on the sample N=64 (N=38 and 63 when a second and third standard deviation 









correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance.  
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TABLE 2.  GDP per capita and Settlements. 
Panel A: Dependent variable: 
 log GDP per capita in 1995 
(Two-Stage Least Squares) 
(8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13) 
Constant   7.85  7.24  7.71  7.90  7.41  7.85 
Settlements 1900 
(0.26, 0.29) 
     2.66*** 
(0.57) 
     4.96*** 
(1.20) 
     3.23*** 
(0.88) 
     2.47*** 
(0.32) 
     3.91*** 
(0.80) 
     2.68*** 
(0.41) 
R
2 adjusted  0.25  0.34  0.37  0.36  0.39  0.40 
N  38  63  38  38  63  38 
             
Panel B: Dependent variable: 
Settlements 1900 













Constant  0.44  9.37  0.97  0.36  0.50  0.60 
Gold and Silver 1900 
(0.99, 1.23)                 
     0.12*** 
(0.03) 
     0.11*** 
(0.04) 




    –0.03** 
 (0.01)   
    –0.02*** 
 (0.01) 
     –0.03*** 
 (0.01)   
     –0.03*** 
 (0.01) 
Log Settler Mortality  
(1.25, 1.24)   
    –0.11*** 
 (0.03) 
   –0.14** 
 (0.07)   
     –0.08*** 
 (0.03) 
     –0.06 
 (0.07) 
R
2 adjusted  0.12  0.29   0.37   0.51   0.42   0.51 
N   38   63  38  38  63  38 
Note: Standard deviations for independent variables in parentheses, based on the sample N=63 (N=38 when a second standard deviation is mentioned); 









correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance.   
 
16
Table 3. Current Resource Abundance and Income per Capita 
Dependent variable: 




Oil 95  
(15) 
Zinc 95  
(16) 
Coal 95  
(17) 
Lignite 95  
(18) 
Bauxite 95  
(19) 
Constant   7.63  7.92  7.90  7.73  7.96  8.07 
Gold 1995 
(0.21, 0.22, 0.22, 
0.23, 0.25, 0.27) 
     2.75*** 
     (0.76) 
     2.60*** 
      (0.77) 
    3.14*** 
       (0.77) 
    3.09*** 
       (0.86) 
          2.86 
        (2.00) 
          1.74 
        (1.82) 
Alternative Fuel or 
Mineral 1995  
(–, 5.44, 0.15, 1.15, 
0.04, 0.48)     
       0.02 
      (0.03) 
       –0.72 
        (1.14) 
        0.12 
       (0.18) 
          8.05 
        (7.59) 
        –0.27 
        (0.47) 
R
2 adjusted  0.28  0.26  0.36  0.31  0.06  –0.04 
N 
 
42  24  21  21  7  10 














Table 3 cntd. Current Resource Abundance and Income per Capita 
Dependent variable: 




Iron 95  
(21) 
Lead 95  
(22) 
Nickel 95  
(23) 
Phosphate 95  
(24) 
Constant   7.80  7.91  7.96  8.16  7.69 
Gold 1995 
(0.17, 0.26, 0.22, 
0.23, 0.24) 
   3.30** 
       (1.48) 
   1.84** 
      (0.81) 
    2.87*** 
       (0.78) 
     2.19*** 
       (0.77) 
        2.96** 
       (1.19) 
Alternative Fuel or 
Mineral 1995  
(0.30, 0.20, 0.05, 
0.10, 0.08) 
      –0.46 
       (0.92) 
        1.35 
      (0.95) 
       –0.75 
        (3.73) 
       –0.19 
        (0.35) 
        1.23 
      (3.54) 
R
2 adjusted  0.16  0.20  0.31  0.19  0.25 
N 
 
19  22  21  18  13 










correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance.  
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Table 4. Current Resource Abundance and Institutions 
Institutions85-95  (25)  (26) 
Constant   6.07  6.00 
Gold 1995 
(0.21) 
    3.21** 
     (1.35) 
  1.83* 
(1.01) 
Gold and Silver 
1900 (*)   
    0.55*** 
(0.15) 
R






Note: Standard deviations for independent variables in parentheses, based on the sample of each 












correspond to a 10, 5 and 1% level of significance. 
3. FROM PRECIOUS METALS TO RESOURCE ABUNDANCE  
The  analysis  above  focuses  on  the  beneficial  role  of  precious  metals  through  attracting 
European settlers and improving institutions. In this section, we briefly examine whether we 
can  extend  the  precious  metals  hypothesis  to  agricultural  productivity  as  another  natural 
resource highly valued at the time of colonization. In the eyes of potential European settlers, 
the colonized areas were perceived as regions producing precious metals but also agricultural 
commodities (mainly coffee, tea, cocoa and sugar). These were the main products reaching 
Europe from the New World countries. In many colonies, large plantations were established 
where production was feasible. On average, countries with a high agricultural potential could 
sustain and feed a much larger native population, and as such they provided a large native 
labor force for plantations. At the same time, however, these countries were more densely  
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populated  and  urbanized  discouraging  Europeans  to  settle  in  large  numbers,  but  rather 
establish a small local elite that could regulate agricultural exploitation. 
  In  Table  5,  columns  (27)  and  (28),  we  replicate  columns  (4)  and  (5)  of  Table  1, 
incorporating in Panel B the value of the production of coffee, sugar, cocoa and tea per square 
kilometer  in  1970  (Plantations  1970)  as  a  proxy  for  the  agricultural  potential  across  the 
colonized world. We focus on the production of coffee, sugar, cocoa and tea, since these were 
the  major  exporting  agricultural  commodities  of  the  New  World  to  Europe  at  the  time. 
Although  other  secondary  agricultural  products  may  have  been  exported  to  Europe,  we 
believe  that  focusing  on  these  four  commodities  depicts  in  a  pretty  accurate  manner  the 
agricultural potential of an area and the importance of plantations as an economic activity. We 
acknowledge that a measure of earlier date would be preferable, but extensive disaggregated 
data on commodity volumes and prices do not exist for earlier periods (see United Nations 
Conference  on  Trade  and  Development  (UNCTAD),  Commodity  Yearbook  2000). 
Furthermore,  the  potential  to  produce  these  agricultural  commodities  during  colonization 
should be still largely captured by our proxy, to the extent that climatic and hydro-geologic 
conditions that largely determine such a capacity are persistent. Similarly, Easterly and Levine 
(2003) used dummy variables for primary commodities reflecting whether a country produced 
a commodity or not in 1998-1999, assuming that production patterns persist over time. 
  Similarly  to  precious  metals,  we  find  agricultural  production  to  affect  positively  the 
establishment  of  good  institutions  (as  in  Easterly  and  Levine  2003).  In  that  respect,  our 
findings contradict the “crops hypothesis” by Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) and Sokoloff 
and Engerman (2000) that argue in favor of a negative impact of large-scale plantations on  
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institutional quality. The coefficients for the other variables are not affected by the inclusion 
of agricultural potential. 
  Subsequently, in columns (29) and (30), we replicate columns (11) and (12) of Table 2, 
adding agricultural productivity as an additional regressor to examine whether the positive 
association between institutions and plantations can be attributed to European settlements. Or 
in  other  words,  is  it  the  case  that  areas  of  high  agricultural  potential  established  better 
institutions by attracting relatively more European settlers? Panel A reaffirms the beneficial 
role of settlements on welfare levels, but in Panel B, we find that agricultural productivity 
discouraged  immigration contrary to the  abundance of  precious metals. The relation even 
holds after controlling for the possibility that areas with a high agricultural potential could 
sustain  high  levels  of  native  population  discouraging  Europeans  immigration  (in  order  to 
avoid frequent frictions with the indigenous people). This finding is consistent with Sokoloff 
and Engerman’s (2000) argument that privileged elites in areas of plantations often imposed 
institutions  discouraging  European  immigration  to  preserve  their  exclusive  position.  To 
summarize, colonies rich in agricultural products did not attract many European settlers, but 










TABLE 5.  GDP per capita, Institutions and Settlements (Precious Metals and Plantations). 
Panel A: Dependent variable: log 
GDP per capita in 1995 (Two-Stage 
Least Squares) 
(27)  (28)  (29)  (30) 
Constant   4.08  2.65  7.99  7.46 
Institutions 85-95 
(1.47, 1.45) 
     0.64*** 
(5.68) 
     0.83*** 
(0.13)     
Settlements 1900 
(0.25, 0.29)     
     2.08*** 
(0.36) 
     3.58*** 
(0.66) 
R
2 adjusted  0.46  0.42  0.30  0.37 
N  38  64  38  63 
         
Panel B: Dependent variable: 
(First Stage Regressions)  Institutions 85-95  Settlements 1900 
Constant  7.18  8.44  0.39  0.55 
Gold and Silver 1900 
(0.95, 1.23, 0.99) 
     0.57*** 
(0.11) 
     0.45*** 
(0.13) 
     0.12*** 
(0.03) 
    0.10** 
(0.04) 
Plantations 1970 
(0.73, 0.54, 0.43) 
        0.39** 
       (0.16) 
      0.34** 
     (0.17) 
    –0.09*** 
    (–0.03) 
     –0.08** 
      (0.03) 
Urbanization 1500 
(5.10) 
  –0.10** 
       (0.04)   
     –0.03*** 
(–0.01)   
Log Settler Mortality  
(1.24)   
   –0.45*** 
     (0.16)   
    –0.09*** 
(0.03) 
R
2 adjusted   0.32   0.32   0.52   0.43 
N  38  64  38  63 
Note: Standard deviations for independent variables in parentheses, based on the sample N=64 


















Many scholars have been concerned with explaining the divergent development paths of non-
European economies after the era of European colonization.  Recently, much attention has 
been given to the institutional aspect of economic development and its origin in European 
immigration.  Europeans  immigrated  and  imported  their  welfare-supporting  institutions  in 
regions of scarce indigenous populations and of mild disease environment. In this paper, we 
highlight another factor that significantly describes the endogenous character of colonization 
strategies, namely the endowments in precious metals. We find that regions rich in highly-
valued gold and silver were prominent settling destinations and in addition thereto, that these 
areas were fortunate enough to inherit better institutions. This finding suggests that, even if 
nowadays minerals have a contracting growth impact as suggested by the “resource curse 
hypothesis”, in the past natural resources have been beneficial for welfare. 
  We consider several extensions of our analysis of interest for studying the institutional 
dimensions  of  economic  development  and  its  relationship  to  European  immigration.  The 
hypothesis  that  European  immigration  resulted  in  an  investment-conducive  institutional 
framework should be tested, for instance, for a more extensive array of institutional proxies. 
Additionally, we want to search for other intermediate variables as determinants of long-term 
welfare, and see whether these are linked to colonization policies. Thirdly, although the focal 
point  of  the  paper  lies  in  the  impact  of  precious  metals  on  colonization  policies  and 
institutions,  we  believe  the  association  between  agricultural  production  and  institutional 
quality  deserves a further investigation. Although beyond the scope of our analysis at this 
stage, we believe it is of interest to examine in more detail the mechanisms through which  
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agricultural  potential  resulted  in  good  institutions.  Specifically,  we  would  like  to  further 
investigate  the  relation  between  resource  affluence,  population  density,  schooling,  and 
institutional quality. 
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